The reform movements that arose during the antebellum period in America focused on specific issues: temperance, abolishing imprisonment for debt, pacifism, antislavery, abolishing capital punishment, amelioration of prison conditions (with prison's purpose reconceived as rehabilitation rather than punishment), the humane treatment of animals, the humane and just treatment of Native Americans, the establishment of public institutions for the care of the destitute, orphans, blind, and mentally ill, the establishment of public schools, the abolition of tobacco use, vegetarianism, health reform, homeopathic medicine, woman's rights (including, at first, especially the establishment of a woman's right to own property apart from her husband and her right to sue for divorce), and the amelioration of labor conditions (including higher pay, the right to form unions, the right to strike, and the demand for limits on the number of work hours, and safe working conditions).

Although many people became convinced or active in one or two of these issues, the leading activists for these causes were often interchangeable, and would meet at loosely linked conventions of reformers, where they shared enthusiasms and political strategies, and jostled for leadership niches in the various reform movements. All these causes did not arise at the same time, but were added or fully articulated one by one. As each arose, many reformers—who took to calling themselves "universal reformers"—took them on and added them to their own collection of causes.

Reform activists during the early part of this period, from about 1820 to about 1840, believed that they could bring about the needed reforms essentially through convincing people, one by one, of the rightness of the cause, or by preaching at them to cause individual "conversion" to the cause. This was called "moral suasion." Unfortunately for the reformers, this did not always bring the success that they wished for—somehow people would not come around to their beliefs, or, at least, not enough of them to spontaneously change the situation that needed reforming. Many reformers, then, abandoned "moral suasion" as their leading strategy and accepted (often, at first, grudgingly) the need for "associated" effort, meaning in the beginning, efforts to organize associations to advance their causes through political action of various kinds. When even this was not found to bring about the desired reform, advocates of these causes—most particularly, of course, anti-slavery activists—began to accept the rightness of using coercive means by the state, including military and police force, to initiate and enforce the reform.

The reformers were often nourished by Anabaptist roots—especially Baptist or Quaker—or by a form of faith that was essentially a moralizing Puritanism stood on its head, which is to say, Unitarianism, whose forebears were strict Puritans, but who had concluded to reform its doctrine of "endless misery," into an optimistic one of a progressively more joyful heaven on earth. This introduced a utopian, millenialist, perfectionist strand into the reform movement, and was responsible for the innumerable small and large efforts to "come out" of the larger society and set up smaller enclaves or utopian communities, such as the well-known Brook Farm community in Massachusetts. Many of these "come outers" soon "came out," not only of religious sectarianism, but of theistic belief altogether, becoming explicit "Free Thinkers" or atheists. Unsurprisingly, the center of the reform movement was New England (especially Boston) and areas further west, like Ohio and then Michigan, where New Englanders were resettling.

Taken together, many of the reforms coalesced around the larger notion of changing society into a socialist paradise. This is not a later interpretation of what the self-declared reformers were up to, but was often expressed by the leading reformers themselves, who were individually attuned to philosophical and political trends in Europe, especially in France, Germany, and England, as they evolved after the radicalism of the French Revolution, and the resulting efforts there to abolish monarchies and long-established religious authorities. American reformers read this essentially as an effort to endow each person in an egalitarian society with a supreme autonomy over his or her own affairs. They discovered, however, a paradox at the heart of this effort—autonomous people were wayward and often needed to be coerced into egalitarian reform, which meant that a larger authority, such as the State, needed to negate individual autonomy in order to bring about an egalitarian society. Such has been the paradox at the heart of socialism ever since.

Historians have often focused on the antebellum period as the "era of reform" in America, culminating in the anti-slavery crusade of the Civil War, but it is also true that 1865 did not mark the end of the reform movement, but initiated a period that persists until today in which reformers, seemingly vindicated by the end of slavery as a result of the war, shifted their thinking so as to focus on the secular State, particularly the federal government, as the main instrument for reforming society along Progressive lines.

Both are true, though neither is the whole story.

Industrialization and the factory system that helped launch it were both part of a larger shift in the American economy from an agricultural economy to one characterized by wage labor. In 1800, for example, three quarters of the nation's workforce was "agricultural"; by 1900, the industrial and service sectors accounted for two-thirds of the workforce. As wage labor supplanted agricultural labor, growing numbers of women entered the paid workforce while unpaid housework took on new cultural and economic significance.

In a very straightforward way, the industrial revolution prompted women to enter the paid workforce. The textile industry provides a vivid illustration. The town of Lowell, MA, for example, was incorporated in 1826 and soon hosted over 30 different mills. Roughly three-quarters of their workers were women, who became nationally known as the "Lowell Mill Girls." In this the textile industry led a broader trend. Between 1850 and 1900, the percentage of all women aged 16 years or older employed in manufacturing industries—most of whom could be categorized as "working class"—ranged between 16 and 23 percent.

In addition to prompting many women to take paid work outside the home, the industrial revolution changed the cultural and economic value of unpaid "housework." Although much of the actual work that women performed in the "domestic sphere" remained the same across the 19th century—cooking, cleaning, caring for children, maintaining family social relationships, and otherwise managing the household economy—culturally it lost much of its former value. As one historian has put it, the "gender division of labor" that once existed slowly became "a gendered definition of labor": men earned wages outside the home ("labor"), and women did unpaid work ("not labor") within it.

Yet this cultural devaluation of women's household work masked its continuing, deep-seated economic importance. Few working-class male wage-earners, for example, earned enough cash to meet all household economic needs, and relied on women's unpaid labor to make up the difference. In other words, working-class women's unpaid work was integral to the basic process of industrialization, providing a hidden "subsidy" to manufacturers that allowed them to pay less-than-subsistence wages to their employees. In this sense, both of the major types of work that women performed—paid and unpaid—were economically significant components of the industrial revolution in the United States.

A number of presidential historians have come to a consensus regarding the qualities that so-called great presidents have exhibited. For example, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. distinguishes great presidents as those who "possess, or are possessed by, a vision of an ideal America." Another historian, Robert Dallek, similarly states "every effective president had a vision or even a series of visions about where he wished to lead the country." In addition to possessing a vision for the nation, great presidents have succeeded in establishing what Schlesinger describes as "a deep psychic connection with the needs, anxieties, dreams of people." They have achieved this bond using education and persuasion to convince Americans to consent to their own vision of the nation's future. Dallek correspondingly writes that effective presidents have needed to found their policies "on a shared national perception of what served the country's well-being." James MacGregor Burns likewise links leadership to the creation of a "collective purpose" measured "by the satisfaction of human needs and expectations."

In addition to vision, Schlesinger observes that while moments of crisis have presented presidents with "opportunities for bold and imaginative action," even without such crises, "forceful and persuasive presidents—Jefferson, Jackson, Theodore Roosevelt, Ronald Reagan—are able to impose their own priorities on the country." Dallek adds pragmatism and credibility as essential qualities of the most effective presidents.

Using the above mentioned criteria, John Adams has not traditionally been viewed as one of the great presidents of the United States. Much of the lingering criticism of Adams can be traced to his re-election campaign of 1800, which he lost to Thomas Jefferson, becoming the nation's first one-term president. During the campaign, he was criticized by both the Republicans, who supported Jefferson, and his own party, the Federalists. Popular historian David McCullough has described the campaign, which resulted in Thomas Jefferson's ascendancy to the presidency, as "a contest of personal vilification surpassing any presidential election in American history." During the 1800 campaign, Adams was called a monarchist, a warmonger, and an indecisive leader during wartime. He was tarred as a vain eccentric with an "ungovernable temper." He was attacked for his conservative outlook and for his tendency to act irresponsibly and capriciously without consulting his cabinet and advisors. His enemies spread rumors that he was insane, and like Jefferson, he was branded as a libertine.

Adams was also blamed both for actions he took during his term in office and for a supposed turn in political philosophy to favor aristocracy and monarchy over republicanism and democracy due to his opposition to the French Revolution. During the subsequent "quasi-war" with France, Adams's signing into law the Alien and Sedition Acts, which he did not initiate, became a liability that tarnished his reputation. His call for new taxes and the creation of a standing army alienated many at the time. With Jefferson's victory characterized as the "Revolution of 1800," Adams's association with the extinguished Federalist party has been proof for many that he was on the wrong side of history.

However, recent biographies have sought to reconsider Adams and his legacy. One biographer, John Patrick Diggins, believes that the assessment of Adams "as something of a loser" stems from a misunderstanding of the legacies of both Adams and Jefferson. Another, C. Bradley Thompson, contends that Adams was consistent in his political thought and did not adopt anti-republican views as his enemies had charged. In addition, John Ferling emphasizes Adams's decision to send a peace mission to France despite opposition within his administration and party—an action that many believe cost him the 1800 election—as not only "a courageous deed, an act of statesmanship that saved countless lives," but as an act that "spared the new nation unimaginable dangers—dangers to the survival of its republican experiment as well as to the very existence of the Union." These authors and others assert that Adams's success at preserving the nation's liberty despite his failings as a political leader point to his enduring legacy. However, some of the lingering criticism stems from Adams himself, writing, "I am not, never was, & never shall be a great man."