The Tet Offensive

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
Contents on the Quang Nam Phung Hoang to be presented orally by the PSA

I. Introduction:
This briefing is addressed toward the Phung Hoang Program in Quang Nam Province; its strengths, weaknesses and recommendations for improvement. In support of this briefing, I have for you two staff studies concerning the transfer of responsibility for the attack on the VCI from the military police, and a summation of the status of the VCI program coordinator, and the other by the advisor to the national police.

II. Discussion:
A. Status of the Phung Hoang
1. General
The apparatus of the Phung Hoang (PIOCC and DIOCC's) has not achieved the goal that its name impies, IE, to be an Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center for the attack on the infrastructure. In most cases, the formal organization of the Phung Hoang have become repositories of information, useful for studies, but much like an archive. Often there is a failure to react to intelligence, or to develop the systemic pursuit of the VCI that the programs invisions.

2. Command Emphasis
The Heads of Vietnamese Agencies and military chiefs seem often not to understand or be interested in the program. The latter is not surprising in light of recent discoveries of fairly high level VC penetration of GVN agencies. Aside from that, Vietnamese agencies, perhaps as legacy of the French, are organized vertically with little impetus to communicate laterally at the lower levels. It is the objective of Phung Hoang to establish lateral lines of communications at the district and province level, in order to coordinate and exchange information while it is still timely. This runs contrary to the grain of Vietnamese organizations and experience, and it is little wonder that the Phung Hoang has not performed up to expectations in that regard. Official GVN declarations of support for the program are sincere, but follow up province and district chiefs and heads of agencies is spotty. Forceful leadership in this amalgamated organization is a basic necessity, but too often strong leaders are lacking that could make the system work.

3. Personnel
In most cases, the Vietnamese agencies have assigned competent personnel to work in the formal organizations of the Phung Hoang, but they are in need of more training. The U.S. Officers assigned to districts as Phoenix Coordinators are young with little intelligence experience. Only two of the eight District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center (DIOCC) Coordinators presently assigned in Quang Nam Province have had an intelligence assignment prior to their assignment to Vietnam. Most of them carry an MOS/9303, combat intelligence. Since the task of the DIOCC Coordinator is a dual one, IE, assisting the subsector S-2 in both military and political order of battle, an MOS/9301 is appropriate. However, the task of tracking VCI involves areas not normally expected of an officer trained in combat intelligence, and approximates the training given to a counter-intelligence officer, MOS/9666. Recent officer replacements have had language training, a positive factor for any advisor. What the junior officers at district level lack in experience and training is somewhat compensated for in enthusiasm and inventiveness. These qualities are extremely important in Vietnam where close control and uniformity of action is neither possible nor desirable. The newly assigned intelligence NCO's have a college education, and nearly all have a one year course in the Vietnamese language. The NCO's (many of them are still E-4's) carry a 975 MOS, counter-intelligence specialist. This compliments the training of the officer assigned as DIOCC coordinator, thereby adequately covering both military and political order of battle.

B. STRENGTHS:
1. My intelligence officers tell me that even with the obvious shortcomings of the Phung Hoang Program, that lateral communications at province and district level have improved considerably since 1967. There is vastly improved flow of information, much of it due to the Phung Hoang Program.

2. the Phung Hoang has succeeded in mobilizing a large number of agencies in the attack on the VCI, heretofore indifferent to the threat or unable to participate in the attack.

3. The Phung Hoang Program has assisted in an understanding of the VCI threat as a common problem and initiated the beginnings of a coordinated attack against it.

4. Statistically, and visibly, the Phung Hoang Program has contributed to reducing the number of VCI and improved security. Over 5000 VCI have been neutralized in Quang Nam since the program's beginning in 1968. VC rice and tax collections are down, VC propaganda activities reduced, VC communications made more difficult, VC education and medical services reduced, and the VC legal system largely curtailed.

5. Recent specific examples of Phung Hoang successes include: HIEU NHOM DISTRICT DIOCC, 3 Nov 70, captured one PW, and in reacting to information provided by the PW, the DIOCC captured 37 VCI in Cam Ha village, thus effectively neutralizing the bulk of the VCI in that village. HIEU DUC DISTRICT DIOCC, 14-15 Nov 70, a DIOCC directed ambush succeeded in killing the VC security chief of Hoa Luong village and a female commoliason cadre, and wounding one VC security cadre. HIEU DUC DISTRICT DIOCC, 17 Nov 70, a second DIOCC directed ambush set up near the home of the security chief of Hoa Hung village was successful in killing the security chief and a supply cadre. DIEN BAN DISTRICT DIOCC, two successful roll-up operations were conducted in the past two months, however both were the result of an original chance capture, and not specific targeting. QUANG NAM PROVINCE, Jan to Nov 1970, averaging over 220 VCI neutralizations per month, the highest in the country, the majority being captured and rallied rather than killed. Specific targeting operations account for approximately 30% of all neutralizations in Que Son District.

C.WEAKNESSES:
1. Cooperation between agencies in the attack on the VCI is incomplete and forced, and competition between agencies is occasionally encouraged.

2. GVM Command emphasis generally lacks follow-up. This results in inconsistant and spotty performance, with high points of activity immediately following the application of command emphasis.

3. Specific targeting ranges from fair to poor, with general targeting accounting for most neutralization.

4. There is a lack of aggressiveness in pursuing leads, levying EEI (Essential Elements of Information), and operational follow-up on good intelligence.

5. There is a lack of an aggressive DIOCC reaction arm. National Police Field Force (NPFF) units are limited as to methods and areas of permissable operation by guarantees made to Field Force Members on recruitment.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. that GVM command emphasis be manifested by assigning the best possible people to the Phung Hoang Organization.

2. That one responsible individual be designated to run the DIOCC/PIOCC with sufficient rank (either police or military) to insure compliance to all orders without the necessity of channeling orders through agency heads.

3. that the administrative support (office supplies and money) now furnished by Phoenix to the formal Phung Hoang apparatus be phased-out, and an existing Vietnamese agency be tasked with providing that support.

4. That the police field force be modified to provide the district Phung Hoang apparatus with an effective reaction arm:

A. The NPF be placed directly under the control of the day-to-day chief of the DIOCC (see recommendation #2), without the requirement to channel all orders through he district police chief.
B. Revise the rules governing the NPFF to lift the limitations on their use.
C. Interogate the NPFF and the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit.
D. Equip the NPFF with the hardwar (radios to net with military radios, weapons) leadership, and training (esspecially for Heliborne operations) to make them capable of operating anywhere in the province.

III. SUMMARY
That concludes my briefing, the question of police vs military control of the Phung Hoang Program and Apparatus is covered in detail in the two staff studies included in the briefing folder.