About the Author

Fritz Fischer is a Professor of History and Director of History Education at the University of Northern Colorado. He is the 1998 recipient of the College of Arts and Sciences award for outstanding teaching and the recipient of the Mortar Board Outstanding Teacher Award in 2003 and 2006.

The Tet Offensive

Agenda and Testimony of William Colby (1970)

Annotation

Texas Tech University has collected a treasure trove of primary sources from the Vietnam War in its “Vietnam Center and Archive.” This document is testimony from William Colby, the Director of CORDS, “Civil Operations and Development Support” in February of 1970 (two years after Tet). CORDS was the central bureaucracy responsible for directing all counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam, including the Phoenix program. This testimony argues that the U.S. and South Vietnamese have been “increasing their understanding of and forging the tools necessary to fight on several levels of the people’s war.” It is not accidental that Colby later became a central figure in American international policymaking, including service as Director of the CIA. For classroom use, excerpts from page 1, 2, 5; 13-14; 17-19 work well. Pagination refers to document page numbers, not PDF pagination.

OPENING STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR W.E. COLBY FOR THE HEARINGS BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE 17 FEBRUARY 1970
(page 1)
Mr. Chairman:
The leaders of the North Vietnam call the conflict in Vietnam a People's War. They saw it as a new technique of war, one which would enable them to win despite greater military power on the side of the government and its allies. They believed they could seize control of the population and pull it from under the government structure, causing its collapse. For a time, it looked as though they might be correct. Their power steadily built up during the organizational phase of their effort during the late 1950's through the guerrilla period of the early 1960's to the stage in late 1964 when they sent North Vietnamese units to prepare a final assault on the centers of government authority. They scenario was interrupted, however, when American combat forces entered in mid-1965 to keep final victory from their grasp.

Since 1965, the Vietnamese and American Governments have been increasing their understanding of and forging the tools necessary to fight on the several levels of a people's war. The organizational tools were developed , the personnel were indoctrinated and the strategy outlined by which such a war must be conducted. This was a gradual process to which many Vietnamese, Americans and other nationals contributed. The process is by no means complete. Even more important, much of the execution of the program on the ground still lies ahead and setbacks will occur. However, the fundamentals have been identified and the program is well launched. As a result, the war called a People's War by the Communists is being increasingly waged by the Vietnamese people,

(page 2)
defending themselves against Communist attack, terror and subversion and at the same time building a better future of their own choosing.
What I will describe is only a part of our effort to bring the war in Vietnam to an end. President Nixon has clearly set the policy which the program I will describe supports. The President has stated three ways by which our participation in the war can be reduced; negotiations, a reduction of violence by Hanoi, and a strengthening of the Vietnamese Government and the people, which we call Vietnamization. The program I will describe falls under the last. Its objective is an increase in South Vietnam's capacity to defend itself, thereby permitting a reduction of American participation in the war. The lessons we have learned in Vietnam can increase Vietnam's ability to defend itself.

The program is called Pacification and Development by the Government of Vietnam. It operates behind the shield of furnished by another aspect of our efforts in Vietnam, the military operations of the Vietnamese and allied armies. However bold, however well conceived, however logical this program, it has been amply proven that it cannot be effective unless hostile regiments and divisions are kept away. At the same time, however, we have found that their absence does not thereby produce peace nor offer political fulfillment to the people. While armies can repel armies, and can assist in the consolidation of security, the very power, organization and procedures, which are essential in large-scale combat make it difficult for them to fight on all the levels of the People's War. Thus additional tactics and techniques had to be developed to fight on these levels. Pacification and Development is this necessary counterpart to the military efforts of our forces in this new kind of war.

(page 5)
One of the major lessons about the People's War has been the key role the infrastructure play in it. This Communist apparatus has been operating in Vietnam for many years and is well practices in covert techniques. To fight the war on this level, the government developed a special program called PHUNG HOANG or PHOENIX. The government has publicized the need for this effort to protect the people against terrorism and has called upon all the citizens to assist by providing information, and they are doing so.

Since this is a sophisticated and experienced enemy, experts are also needed to combat it. Thus the PHOENIX program started in mid-1968 to bring together police, the military and other government organizations to contribute knowledge and act against this enemy infrastructure. It secures information about the enemy organization, identifies the individuals who make it up and conducts operations against them. These operations might consist of two policemen walking down the street to arrest an individual revealed as a member of the enemy apparatus or they might involve a three battalion attack on a jungle hideout for a district or province committee. As a result of this program, members of this apparatus are captured, turn themselves in as ralliers or are killed in fire fights. More needs to be done for this program to be fully effective, but the government has a high priority on it. Our own government provides advisory assistance and support to this internal security program through the police, the administration, the information, services and the intelligence services. This is similar to our support of the military effort against the North Vietnamese battalions and Viet Cong guerrilla groups through the Vietnamese military forces.

(page 13-14)
In addition to these advisory teams, there are two special groups of personnel who participate in the pacification mission. Some of these are in Mobile Advisory Teams, or MATs. These are Army teams of two officers and three NCCs whose job is to live, work with the assist in the improvement of Regional Force companies and Popular Force platoons. Another type of team involved in similar work is the US Marine Corps Combined Action Platoon or CAP. This consists of a squad of US Marines lead by their Squad Leader, assigned to work with a Vietnamese Popular Force platoon, living in the same area, patrolling and generally helping them with their job and to improve their performance. There are 353 MAT teams which include approximately 2,000 Marines and Navy Corpsmen. Both of these teams are used in certain areas for a period, with a special emphasis on upgrading the local Regional or Popular Force units with which they are working. When they reach a satisfactory position, the team is moved to another area to repeat the process with another unit. The planning, of course, is that they will gradually complete this job of upgrading and that the program will then be phased out, leaving the Vietnamese local force unit to continue without direct American involvement.

These are the American personnel who work directly in the pacification program and with CORDS. In addition, of course, many American units conduct pacification activities in their assigned areas. You have recently hear of the activities of the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Binh Dinh Province. This is matched by a number of other American units which collaborate directly with Regional and Popular Force units to increase the effectiveness of these units and improve the territorial security of the area. The pacification program also profits from the many projects carried out by US units in the form of Civic

Action, many doctors from the Army, Navy and Air Force serve on special teams in province hospitals, and the Navy Seabees carry out many programs which both support pacification and train Vietnamese in skills for the future.
The funding of the CORDS operation comes from four sources, DOD's and AID's appropriations, AID's counterpart funds generated by imports, and the GVN's own budget from taxes, customs, and deficit financing. The greater portion of the expenditures by both the US and the GVN is used for the territorial forces and the police, with AID supporting development and refugee programs. Both the US and GVN have substantially increased their investments in pacification over the past several years, which is certainly a major reason for its improvement. The 1970 contributions are:
DOD $729 million
AID $48 million
Counterpart $114 million (equivalent)
GVN $627 million (equivalent)

As can be seen, in funding as in personnel, CORDS is an integration of the programs of several agencies. It was designed to meet a new situation on the ground and it cuts across many of our familiar civil-military or departmental distinctions. It has been called a Rube Goldberg creation and I suppose in many respects it is. The key point, however, is that it is working and that it works with the Vietnamese.
Because it is the relationship with the Vietnamese which will decide whether the program will work or fail, it cannot be American. Americans can assist the Vietnamese temporarily and can help them take over the full program. Our resources are important. Our imagination and our energy are also important. But we must address these to helping Vietnamese to do the job themselves. This process will be described in detail by the officers who are accompanying me:

(page 17-19)
. . . The enemy began a People's War of Insurgency and ended by conducting primarily a North Vietnamese Army invasion. The Government and its allies first tried to meet the attack with conventional forces and tactics but are now utilizing all the techniques and programs of a People's War.

As a result of this long process, in early 1970 the change in the countryside is there to be seen. Except in one or two areas, the large enemy battalions, regiments and divisions are in the border sanctuaries. The roads are open to many markets and, from the air, tin roofs sparkle throughout the countryside where families are once again tilling their long-abandoned farms. We have statistical measures of all of these changes, imperfect but the best we could develop. But the real difference can only be experienced by driving on the roads, visiting the markets, and by talking to a 12-year-old schoolgirl who informs you that she is again attending school in her village after a three year period in which none existed. A friend once complained that the pacification program does not produce dramatic results. from day to day it does not, but the difference in Vietnam from Tet of 1968 is certainly dramatic to the Vietnamese peasant.

There is more work to be done. At night there are still guerrillas in Vietnam, and the roads open in the day are deserted and dark, occasionally criss-crossed by contending local forces. The grenades still go off in the theaters or tea shops as the terrorist demonstrates his continued presence. Some officials have by no means caught the spirit of the village community and endeavor to assert their old Mandarinal privileges of dictation from above. There are still refugees and others whose lives have been blighted by the war who must be helped to a decent place in society. Most of all, North Vietnamese divisions are over the border or in jungle redoubts, and prepare for other sallies against South Vietnam.
At the beginning of 1970, however, there is a vast difference in the situation. The government is organized to conduct a People's War and is showing the leadership and drive to create a better and safer society for its citizens. Its 1970 Pacification and Development Plan is in many respects more venturesome and ambitious than the 1969 plan. Its key lies in consolidation of the admittedly thin layer of security established in many areas. It also sets high goals in political, economic and social development, not all of which may be reachable. In response to its leadership and its politics, however, its citizens are beginning to participate in self defense, self government and self development. And the Army has repelled North Vietnamese assaults at Bu Prang and Ben Het. It is by no means inevitable that this process must be reflected in new kinds of action in every hamlet and village in the land. This process has begun, but the future will include some dark days and even some local disasters. I believe, however, that a satisfactory outcome can be achieved so the Vietnamese people will have a free choice as to their future.
The outcome will depend more and more upon Vietnamese leadership upon Vietnamese commitment and even upon Vietnamese resources. We Americans have played a substantial role in learning about this new kind of war, but one of the lessons is that it must be waged by the people and not merely the government of Vietnam. The American contribution is personnel and in resources will gradually reduce, to be replaced by full mobilization of people willing to sacrifice to remain free and to carry out the programs to make these sacrifices meaningful.

The Vietnamese people and government are shouldering more of the load today than they did last year, and their plans and programs envisage a greater effort tomorrow. This is true in the military field; it is also true in the field of pacification and development. The lessons learned and applied about this new form of war are making the Vietnamese effort pay greater dividends in terms of local security, political support and hopes for peace. I am neither optimistic nor pessimistic about the future of this program and of Vietnam, nor do I offer any pat solutions to difficult situations. I prefer to rely upon the determination of the Vietnamese people and government and of the Americans who are now assisting them to take over this job. I am privileged to present to you today several representative Americans with this determination, and I invite you to hear from them what we have learned about the Peoples' War and how it must be fought.

Citation

The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University. "“Agenda and Testimony of William Colby to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations." February 17, 1970.