Although at times the 1787 Constitutional Convention became bogged down in details, the delegates generally debated the “big picture” of crafting a new fundamental document for the United States. Given that bias for the larger topics, it is not surprising the delegates did not discuss at any length the age requirement for serving as a member of the House of Representatives, in the Senate, or as the President. What concerned them was not the age of the individual, but the quality of the representation provided to the people by those individual federal representatives.

During the convention, on May 29, 1787, Edmund Randolph of Virginia proposed what is now known as the Virginia Plan, originally drafted by James Madison. The fourth resolution stated: “that the members of the branch of the national Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several States every           for the term of           ; to be the age of           years at least . . .” Randolph and Madison left the specifics of elections and the ages of the members of the legislatures open for the convention to debate. Several weeks later, on June 22, the conversation in the convention turned to the issue of the election, length of service, and age of eligibility for members of the House. George Mason of Virginia rose and proposed 25 years of age as a qualification for the members of the first branch (House of Representatives). Mason’s motion passed seven states in favor, three opposed, and New York divided. Three days later, the convention took up Randolph’s resolution again, this time addressing the second branch (the Senate), and unanimously agreed to the clause requiring the age of members to be at least 30 years of age.

Since what most concerned the members of the convention were what Mason called “the danger of the majority oppressing the minority, and the mischievous influence of demagogues,” details such as the specific ages required to become representatives and senators did not rise to the level of major debate. Other issues were deemed far more important, such as how to elect the executive and the specific powers of the president, because of the controversial and dangerous nature of the proposed executive. The age requirements for president were included in the final recommendations that were agreed to by the Committee of Eleven (one member from every state). These required that the president be a “natural born citizen” at the time of the Constitution’s adoption, must have lived in the United States at least 14 years, and be no less than 35 years old.

Further evidence that the supporters of the proposed 1787 Constitution considered the issue of ages a detail can be found in the Federalist Papers. What concerned Publius (the pseudonym used by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay) was not the age of the representatives (mentioned only in passing in Federalist 51-54), but the timing and frequency of elections to maintain accountability to the people in the states. Biennial elections allowed representatives to reflect the changing moods of the electorate at home while providing institutional stability in the House.

The Federalist Papers also address requirements for office. In Federalist 62, Publius examines the constitutional requirement for becoming a senator. Again, it was not the age of the individual that mattered so much as the length of residency in the country and the individual’s level of maturity. The differing requirements for Senate (vs. House of Representatives), Publius wrote, “is explained by the nature of their senatorial trust; which requiring greater extent of information and stability of character, requires at the same time that the senator should have reached a period of life most likely to supply these advantages.” So too with the proposed presidency; Publius argues in Federalist 67-71 that the older age was needed because of the burden, trust, and perspectives needed in an executive.

Thus, while it would be wrong to say that the members of the Federal Convention assigned the ages haphazardly, it would also be wrong to say that they spent much time debating the virtues of 25, 30, and 35 years old to hold federal elected office. Rather, they followed the patterns already established in the states, and they increased the ages as the importance and burdens of federal office increased.

Here are three possibilities about what you were told, none of which match precisely what you have described.

One possibility relates to the actions of Lincoln just after he assumed the presidency in 1861. By late March and early April, several southern states had seceded, but a few closer to the North—Virginia, in particular—had not. Virginia had called a Constitutional Convention to decide its course, but those in favor of remaining in the Union were in control of the convention, and this apparently accorded with public sentiment in Virginia. Nevertheless, the convention did not adjourn, so the outcome was still undecided.

During those weeks, the political and military situation was extremely volatile. The Federal army's forces at Fort Sumter in Charleston Bay and at Fort Pickens outside Pensacola needed to be relieved or reinforced, especially in the face demands from South Carolina and Florida. These two states called for the evacuation of federal soldiers at the forts, an action that would have been widely seen as a de facto recognition of the legality of their secession.

In testimony after the war at a congressional hearing, John Minor Botts and John Baldwin, both pre-war Virginia politicians and delegates to the Virginia convention in Richmond, gave contradictory testimony about Lincoln’s actions. Botts claimed that Lincoln had asked to confer with Baldwin, and that during their talk, Lincoln asked Baldwin to relay to the convention a pledge that, if it would adjourn without voting for secession, he would evacuate the federal forces from Forts Sumter and Pickens. Botts met with Lincoln several days later, he testified, and Lincoln had told him about the offer. This had alarmed Botts, who heard nothing of the offer from Baldwin. Botts claimed that Baldwin, on his own initiative, said nothing about the offer because it could have prevented Virginia’s secession. Baldwin, however, strongly denied that Lincoln had made any offer during their conversation.

Nevertheless, by the time Lincoln met with Botts, he had already dispatched orders to send forces by sea to relieve Forts Sumter and Pickens, an action that South Carolina and Florida resisted by force. After the bombardment of Fort Sumter from Charleston and its fall, sentiment in Virginia and at the convention shifted dramatically, and Virginia seceded.

In the hearing, Botts—who was a Unionist before and throughout the war—said that Lincoln’s offer elevated the president’s reputation as a statesman who was genuinely seeking peace and the preservation of the Union. The Radical Republicans who presided over the hearing, however, were troubled by the idea that Lincoln had made such an offer, because, from their point of view, it would suggest that he had been willing to “offer a bribe to Treason.”

Historian Nelson Lankford points out that Lincoln may have been pursuing more than one course during the first weeks of his presidency, before hostilities erupted. He was criticized in the press for indecision, but in fact he had been working to resolve conflicting advice within his cabinet. His secretary of state, William Seward, in particular, advocated resolving the issue through negotiation, rather than by force.

Another possibility relates to the presidential election of 1864, when the Democrats nominated General George B. McClellan. The party's platform called for an end to prosecuting the war and a truce with the Confederacy, which would have ended the war by allowing the secession of southern states. McClellan himself did not agree with this and advocated continuing the war. Because the war had not been going well for the North, the Democrats might have won the election, but Union victories close to election day bolstered the Republicans, and Lincoln was re-elected.

The Democrats' "peace plank" had declared the war a failure and promised to end hostilities. Its author was Clement Laird Vallandigham (a photo of him is at the top of the page), an Ohio politician who was arrested, tried, and convicted by a military tribunal the previous year for "disloyal" statements. Instead of serving time in jail, he was exiled south by Lincoln. From there he traveled to Canada and accepted the Ohio democratic nomination for governor in absentia. During his campaign, which he ran from a hotel room in Canada, he pledged, if elected, to withdraw Ohio from the Union unless Lincoln ceased hostilities with the Confederacy.

Vallandigham lost the election in a landslide, but continued to be influential in the Democratic Party. If McClellan had won the 1864 presidential election, many Democrats were determined that Vallandigham should serve as secretary of war.

A third possibility relates to the closing days of the war. Radical Republicans in congress as well as Secretary of War Edwin Stanton became concerned that Lincoln would allow the confederate states back into the Union without punishing them or forcing them to outlaw slavery.

Their fears seemed well-founded when they learned that Lincoln, during a trip to Richmond after its fall, early in April 1865, consulted with at least one Virginia politician and had informally encouraged him to help reconvene the Virginia legislature, declare the state's loyalty to the Union, and order Virginia's soldiers to lay down their arms. In return, said Lincoln, the legislature would be recognized as the de facto government of the state and it could begin to restore order. Republicans viewed Lincoln's offer as an attempt to usurp the power of Congress and as a "bribe of unconditional forgiveness." The point soon became moot, however, by Lee's surrender of his army at Appomatox. The Virginia Legislature did not reconvene.